Longitudinal Form and the Human Conceptus by Fernandes, Ashley K.
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 63 | Number 1 Article 3
February 1996
Longitudinal Form and the Human Conceptus
Ashley K. Fernandes
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Fernandes, Ashley K. (1996) "Longitudinal Form and the Human Conceptus," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 63: No. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol63/iss1/3
Longitudinal Form and 
the Human Conceptus 
by 
Mr. Ashley K. Fernandes 
The author, a second year medical student, has two Bachelor of the Arts degrees, one 
in biology and one in philosophy. 
Human rights are not a privilege conferred by the government. They are every 
human being's entitlement by virtue of his humanity. The right to life does not 
depend, and must not be declared to be contingent, on the pleasure of anyone else, 
not even a parent or sovereign . .. I have no new teachingfor America. I seek only to 
recall you to faithfulness to what you once taught the world. Your nation was 
founded on the proposition - very old as a moral precept, but startling and 
innovative as political insight - that human life is a gift of immeasurable worth, and 
that it deserves, always and everyWhere, to be treated with the utmost dignity and 
respect. 
- Mother Theresa of Cakutta (1994)1 
It was a sincere question, not a political statement. The man in the front row, 
having listened to the medical professor excitedly explain fetal development 
through the first trimester, looked up, awestruck, and blurted out, "If all of this 
information is true, what does this say about abortion?" 
The class sat silent, awaiting my Embryology teacher's answer to THE question. 
I listened and found myself hoping - hoping to hear the truth. As I think on it now, 
I find it terribly saddening that anyone should have to wish to hear the truth! Yet I 
did, because there was nothing else I could do. 
"This class is not really the place to discuss the issue," she said, and went back to 
the lecture. And as the rest of my colleagues went back to madly scribbling down 
her words, I thought to myself, "If not here, then where? Where?" 
The question of moral status and protection for the pre-embry02 does not, 
unfortunately, rest with the biological fact of her life and humanness. How 
wonderful it would be if people would stop and think about the implications of 
simply being, of coming into existence! But clearly, the idea that humanness and 
personhood are two separate things has been championed by many, not the least of 
which is Justice Blackmun himself in Roe v. Wade. 3 The question is not, "When 
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does life begin?" but instead, "When does life begin to matter?" - or, more 
specifically, "Why should pre-natal life, even as human life, be guaranteed as much 
protection as any stage of post-natal life?" 
I must confess that such a question itself perplexes me; I find quite convincing the 
idea that what is clearly human life is owed dignity and respect based on this fact 
alone. As James Humber put it, " . .. the question concerning one's humanity cannot 
be separated from the question concerning his rights. If a being is human he has, by 
definition, all human rights."4 We all have a strong intuition that life ought to be 
protected because it has moral significance, but living is far more complicated than 
what we intuit. The Black slave became a "person" because, slowly but surely, the 
people in power were able to see, and hear, and feel the humanity of him - a fact 
that should have been recognized from the start. But the case of the pre-embryo is 
biased against her from the beginning; we cannot see her, or hear her, or sense her 
presence - she is utterly voiceless. It is for this reason that the personhood of this first 
stage of humanity demands to be recognized, but need not be established -
personhood is already there. 
A manifold of theories have been proposed to determine personhood, and I intend 
to briefly critique six which I think have significance. This "significance" is due not to 
any shred of credibility, but rather to the numbers of people, educated and not, who 
believe in them, and in particular because they are used to broadly justify early term 
abortions and new reproductive technologies. In the latter half of this essay, I will 
propose a more enlightening and practical alternative to the popular theories of 
personhood, one which fully maintains respect for the sanctity of aU human life. 
"Quickening" 
Distinctions between human life and human personhood are still made in terms 
of sensations felt by the parents. "Quickening" marks the beginning of the time 
period when the baby can be felt by the mother from within (usually the fourth 
month of pregnancy); this standard for protection was commonly used in English 
law as early as 1640, and was carried over to America where it remained prevalent 
in the courts well into the nineteenth century.s Much of the basis for denying 
personhood up to this point today is due to psychological factors. It is very easy to 
dismiss life when one cannot feel its presence; thus, the appeal of the French 
abortion pill RU486 is clear. 
It is my contention that this standard is utterly without merit. Simply because one 
cannot physically feel another does not mean that the other does not exist, or is 
somehow any less of a person. Furthermore, the very fact that the moment when the 
child is "quick" differs from case to case shows how unreliable such a standard is. 
Are we to suppose that one child becomes a person at thirteen weeks, another at 
sixteen weeks, another still later? As the basic biological evidence points out, the 
conceptus is "moving" inside the mother from fertilization, particularly when it 
makes its journey through the Fallopian tube. The fact that the mother cannot 
perceive this movement does not negate the fact that the action continues; if 
anything, such a fact only underscores the limitations of basing human personhood 
on human sensual perception. 
February, 1996 15 
Viability 
Viability of the conceptus has been one of the most popular standards for 
confering personhood; in fact, this was Justice Blackmun's criteria in Roe v. Wade. 
John T. Noonan described this position: 
Before an age of so many months, the fetus is not viable, that is, cannot be removed from the 
mother's womb and live apart from her. To that extent, the life of the fetus is absolutely 
dependent on the life of the mother. This dependence is made the basis of denying 
recognition to its humanity.6 
This theory rests essentially on technology. That is to say, whatever point modern 
medicine can safely sustain the unborn outside the womb of the mother is the line 
established for personhood; the womb in this case serves as a barrier to pre-
embryonic rights. This is indeed troublesome, if one considers the fact that when the 
Roe v. Wade decision was issued, viability was considered to be a little greater than 
six months. Yet since that time the definition of viability has been found legally to 
vary7, in part due to improved perinatal and neonatal care. What this means is that a 
few "non-persons" aborted in 1973 would, by definition, have been persons now 
and entitled to full protection under the law - clearly an absurd position to defend. 
This point is underscored by the fact that as early as the 1960s animal pre-embryos 
have been removed from the womb and artificially sustained.8 This process could 
be theoretically perfected in humans. 
For now, most pre-borns cannot survive before the end of the Canalicular Period 
oflung development (16-25 weeks) due to an underdeveloped respiratory system9, 
but this fact alone cannot negate the right to life of any first trimester child. Noonan 
elaborates on yet another objection: 
Mere length of life is not an exact measure [of viability]. The viability of the fetus depends 
on the extent of its anatomical and functional development . . . Moreover, different racial 
groups have different ages at which their fetuses are viable. Some evidence, for example, 
suggests that Negro fetuses mature more quickly than white fetuses. If viability is the norm, 
the standard would vary with race and with many individual circumstances.1O 
The last objection to the viability theory is one which is perhaps the most compelling, viz., 
dependency is not an adequate criterion for a right to life. Absolute dependency is carried on 
from the unborn stage at least through early childhood; in extremely disabled individuals 
and the elderly we might even extend that time period. But none of us (I hope) would 
advocate the "choice" to kill infants, children, the disabled, or the elderly, even given their 
absolute dependence on the parents or caregiver; nor would we doubt their status as 
"persons". 
Resemblance 
This theory is tied to one of emotional sentiment. It has been recently and concisely put 
forward by James Q. Wilson, professor of public policy at the UCLA. Wilson writes: 
16 
The greater grief a mother experiences at the death of an infant than at the death of a 
ten-week-old fetus does not arise, I think, from the mother's feeling that her carrying the 
fetus to term was more costly, or constituted a greater waste of resources than carrying the 
fetus for only ten weeks. I obviously cannot speak for mothers, but I would imagine from 
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what they say that their feelings on the loss of an actual or potential child do not reflect lost 
investment but lost humanity: the newborn infant is distinctly human, . .. while the fetus is 
somewhat less than fully human. Moreover, the mother sees the infant, but not ordinarily 
the fetus ... I want to assert that it is precisely the degree of resemblance between the fetus 
and an infant that is of moral significance. 11 
This position rests on a faulty assumption - that the conceptus is not fully biologically 
human in the first place. This error aside, let us examine why the pre-embryo is not classified 
as a human person - because she does not "look" like one, and because the feelings which 
the mother has for her would be less than that of an infant. I will grant both of these 
assertions. In fact, I would go so far as to say that if you showed the majority of people 
photographs of the unborn child from conception through the third trimester, you would get 
increasing "pronouncements of humanity" as the chronology of embryonic development 
unfolded. 
But is this an adequate basis for denying personhood to the pre-embryo, particularly 
when life or death are at stake? Certainly, each person's "feelings" or attachment to the 
conceptus would vary. For example, if I were to tell a certain group of people, "Close your 
eyes and picture in your head what a human person looks like," I could bet with excellent 
odds that no one would have the same image. And because we all have different ideas of 
what "persons look like," does this necessarily exclude any image we didn't form in our 
head? We have emotional sentiments about many people, but our lack offeeling for them 
does not strip their humanity. 
To further the point, appearances alone are often an unreliable way of categorizing 
human beings. There are many instances of men resembling women, and women 
resembling men; we might imagine cases where someone of one race will have the 
characteristics of another racial group. Yet, these people, though apparently their 
resemblance does not fit their category, i.e., gender or race, are still objectively within those 
categories. Thus we are able to make the claim (in particular in light of the biological 
evidence) that although we may see pictures of a one-celled zygote who looks nothing at all 
like the newborn infant, this in no way can give us assurance that the entity is not in the 
"human person" category. John Noonan adds: 
Yet experience shows that sight is even more untrustworthy than feeling in determining 
humanity. By sight, color became an appropriate index for saying who was a man, and the 
evil of racial discrimination was given foundation.12 
Our occasional differential emotions toward humans of varying ages (whether pre-born, 
infant, or even elderly) do not stem from perceptions (let alone truths) about humanity. 
Rather, the feeling comes from what we have obviously "put into" the individual- or 
perhaps more accurately - what experiences they have had and we have shared with them. 
It should be emphasized, of course, that our emotional feeling has little to do with the 
separate and objective reality of pre-embryonic personhood. 
Human Interaction and SeIf-ronsciousness 
This theory asserts that a being is II person when one has the ability to make autonomous 
decisions about themselves, for themselves, and for the environment around them. This 
would also presuppose, of course, a certain degree of self-consciousness. This kind of 
thinking was first put forward by esteemed thinkers such as John Locke, who defined a 
person as "A thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself, 
as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places."13 The theory has been 
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re-introduced by Peter Singer, among others; Singer claims that to be a human one 
must go beyond simply being a Homo sapien. If we reduce humanity to this, we are 
(immorally, he says) claiming superiority of our particular species - we are 
engaging in "speciest" thought. Singer argues: 
When I think of myself as the person I now am, I realize that I did not come into existence 
until some time after my birth. At birth I had no sense of the future, and no experience 
which I now remember as "mine." It is the beginning of the lifeofthe person, rather than 
of the physical organism, that is crucial as far as the right to life is concemed.14 
To take this further would be to claim that a human person is one who can engage 
in normal human interaction, possesses the ability to form relationships, and can 
obtain self-fulfillment. 
The problems that arise from this train of thought seem clear enough, if one 
simply looks at infants and children. These beings, if self-conscious at all, can 
hardly be said to possess a degree of sophistication that would enable them to 
engage in the kind of "self-reflection" that Locke was writing of - nor could they 
relate to other humans in the same, complicated way in which adults relate to each 
other. This does not make them, however, any less a person, and certainly not any 
less human. If we take again the example of mentally disabled individuals, who 
quite obviously possess a limited degree of "rationality" in the typical sense (and 
may even possess a different kind of rationality), we find this theory of personhood 
even more objectionable. Under this theory, they would fall into the same category 
as infants and children, and be subject to termination at any time - until they have 
achieved the ability of self-consciousness and human interaction that is befitting a 
"real person." 
Kevin Doran poses another interesting and devastating objection to this 
standard: 
The failure of Locke and Hume, and more recently of the school of thought represented by 
Singer, Harris and Tooley is that, in basing personhood on the ability to desire, to have a 
continuous consciousness, or to achieve a certain distinctly human level of performance, 
they overlook the fact that all this presupposes a being who desires, is conscious and 
performs at such a level . .. . what Singer, Harris, and Tooley have done is to confuse the 
concept of personality, something which is variable and accidental, with the concept of 
person, which is invariable and essential.l5( my emphasis] 
Both of these points are vital. In order for any being to achieve self-consciousness, 
they must first actually be. And if we grant this fact, we must then ask, how could 
one being suddenly change from a non-person to a person? Even if the change 
were gradual, we would be left with the notion that some beings possessed a 
greater degree of personhood than others; and, when we take into account that on 
this basis alone their life mayor may not be protected, we can clearly see how 
dangerous and immoral such a standard would be. Further, Doran is correct in 
identifying the basis of the human interaction standard as qualities to be found in 
personality; simply from the description above, one can see that human desires and 
interactions come about, in varying degrees, over time. As he puts it, "Being of a 
rational nature does not imply that a being is always or ever, actually, rational, but 
only that it belongs to a species, one aspect of whose nature is rationality."16 Given 
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this kind of argumentation, we are left, at the very least, with the possibility that 
personhood may indeed be justified on simply being a member of the human race. 
Potentiality 
The theory of potentiality can be described as follows: 
The standard potentiality argument argues that despite the fact that embryos do not have 
properties now, they have the potential to develop them. They claim that if an embryo has 
the potential to be a person with the "right to life," the right to life should apply before the 
"stage" of being a person is reachedP 
Despite the fact that such a claim could be (and has been, presumably) used with 
good intention by pro-life advocates in the past, I disagree with the fundamental 
premise of it, viz., that human life could ever be a potential person. This I think 
unnecessarily leads to ambiguity, and of course, opens the right-to-life position to a 
plethora of attacks. 
Primarily, the argument suffers since it grants that simply being human life has 
no consequence, no value in itself.IS That is precisely why making the transition 
from a "potential" to a "real" is so vital in this theory. 
Further, it would be absurd to confer upon something-which-is-not (the 
"potential" conceptus), the rights of something-which-is ("full" human beings), 
particularly if the rights are in conflict. It is my contention that this line of 
argumentation is not persuasive, and I think (ironically) that many pro-abortion 
advocates would agree. We might be able to conclude that the conceptus is a 
potential embryo, a potential fetus, and a potential post-natal being - a future 
someone. However, integrated into each one of these stages is both an already-
established human life and personhood, which remains unchangeable. Thus, what 
is actually necessary for moral status and hence, protection from death, need not be 
"searched for" as a potential, for it already is. 
Birth 
I need only spend a short time on this theory, because it is inherently so weak, 
that to present an elaborate critique of it would only serve to grant undeserved 
legitimacy. This theory holds that the unborn become persons "whenever they are 
born." Often it has been justified by the claim that one is not a citizen until birth, 
thus one should not possess the rights of citizenship prior to that time. (One of 
these is a right not to be killed, or more specifically, to be protected by the State 
from unjust harm.) This idea becomes instantly discredited if we consider 
pre-mature births; is the eight month old fetus, capable of being born at any time, 
any less a person than the nine month old, who is just born? According to the 
birth standard it may in fact be permissible to slay a child when the cervix is fully 
dilated, while she is still in the "process" of being born. This reductio ad 
absurdum only underscores the point that since births themselves are so variable, 
the conferring of human personhood at parturition is essentially meaningless. 
Moreover, legal citizenship granted at birth is certainly not the basis for human 
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rights, particularly the right to life. Being born is clearly not tenable as a standard 
for personhood; perhaps we can now finally consider simply being. 
Longitudinal Fonn: Respecting the Human Whole 
The theory oflongitudinal form was proposed eloquently by Nicola Poplawski 
and Grant Gilett in their article "Ethics and Embryos"(1991).19 It is this relatively 
obscure theory that I believe poses the best hope of reconciling metaphysics, ethics, 
and biological science, and I shall borrow extensively from it.20 
The Continuum of Human Life 
Poplawski and Gillett make the claim that "the form of the human being 
extends beyond the present at a given slice of time to take in the breadth of an 
entire life. There is a phase of development, a phase of moral engagement with 
others and a phase of dying (which may be abrupt or drawn out. ... Because each 
stage is an essential component of the whole, the form of humanity involves a life 
with a characteristic longitudinal 'shape.' "21 This explanation is an attempt at an 
Aristotelian22 kind of metaphysics - a concentration on the form of matter and its 
continuity. Aristotle writes: 
A thing is called one if it is a continuum, or if it is indivisible, and we also call things one if 
one and the same account is given of what the being of each would be: so, for instance, 
wine and the grape.23 
What we see here, applied to all human development, is a continuous process of 
change, where each step "meshes" with the next; the border of every stage of 
physiological growth, by nature, is blurred. In this light, the unity and oneness of 
the human form becomes apparent; although the zygote and the adult human 
appear, by all the senses, to be remarkably different, they together constitute one 
essential form. The most lucid analogy is the color spectrum, wherein one distinct 
color seems to emerge from another, but no precise point of a change in shade is 
discernible. 
Poplawski and Gillett further reason that because we attach high moral 
significance to the phase of moral interaction (post-natal to the beginning of death) 
we ought to consider also the ultimate cause of this phase in like fashion. They 
elucidate: 
Development is, therefore, a process whose overall nature may have distinct moral 
significance. The conceptus begins this process and the "form" which not only governs the 
process, but also makes it morally significant, is realised as time goes by .... If the initial 
stage in the human process does not occur, none of the later stages can be reached and 
therefore this first stage is an essential component of the complex whole in the same way 
that the laying of the foundations is the essential first stage of building a house. Who can 
say that anyone stage of building a house is any more important then another when 
without all stages one has nothing? The conceptus may have moral significance because it 
is an essential component of the total longitudinal form of a morally significant being.24 
This powerful analysis also has ramifications outside the pre-embryo. For 
instance, we could very well use the longitudinal form to justify protection and 
respect for all stages, and all kinds of human life - including children, the 
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elderly, and the terminally ill- insofar as each one contributes essentially to the 
nature of everything which is human. 
The Pre-Embryo in the Human Community 
The alternate theories for personhood (discussed above) generally seek to define 
the person as one who, at a particular stage of development, is able to interact with 
the macro-family with which she is associated. Whether this be at quickening, 
viability, or when the being has gained rationality, the prerequisite for any rights in 
these theories is the acquisition of some kind of human interaction, whether fully 
reciprocal or not.25 
Now if we look at the person as a longitudinal form, we see plainly that human 
life, from the moment of conception, is firmly and irrevocably embedded in the 
human community. As fertilization occurs and a novel constitution is spelled out, 
the pre-embryo begins to make itself ever more a part of that community. The 
interaction begins for her as a physiological one (the sustaining of the newly 
formed zygote in the mother's reproductive tract), proceeds to a physical one 
(implantation and gestation), and eventually, as the family and other humans 
realize her presence, becomes deeply rooted in a manifold of human relationships. 
This process is continuous, and after birth and throughout life, the human person 
gradually develops the ability to communicate, form relationships, and 
rationalize.26 
An obvious objection may be brought to the front at this stage, viz., human 
physiological interaction is not enough to grant moral significance. Poplawski and 
Gillett answer this objection convincingly: 
If physical interaction alone were morally significant, we would be faced with the 
dilemma of having to treat an attached parasite, such as a tapeworm, with the moral 
consideration given an embryo or fetus. But this [argument] neglects the longitudinal 
"form of a person." There is a fundamental difference in form between a tapeworm and a 
human organism; an internal parasite simply grows and reproduces further parasites but a 
human embryo becomes a person with an interactive role in a human community. This 
creates a moral difference.27 
Still another argument may be made at this juncture, even if one accepts the 
basic premises of the longitudinal form approach. If the pre-embryo is part of the 
developmental phase of the longitudinal form, and part of the human community, 
couler we still not reasonably claim that the other phases in human development 
are more important - particularly when a conflict of rights is at stake?28 To 
buttress this, the skeptic might add that clearly the nature of interaction in the 
developmental stage (particularly that of the pre-embryo) is merely physiological, 
while the moral interaction phase involves precisely that - moral interaction. 
They might conclude that, since moral, linguistic, intellectual, and emotional 
relationships are more complex and more integrated into the human community, 
these ought to take precedence over the first phase of the human form. Again, (and 
unknowingly, I think) Poplawski and Gillett adequately rebuff this argument 
when they explain that: 
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· .. an excessively cognitive reading of morally significant interactions leads to problems. 
If one's ability to think and interact/communicate were to be graded, the individual 
whose form included that ability to interact on some yet to be defined "higher plane" than 
others would be more important than other human beings. Perhaps a person whose total 
form included being a university professor would be more significant than an individual 
who was mildly intellectually handicapped. This immediately suggests an elitist attitude 
congenial to "ivory towered academics" but not to "normal" people. It does not seem to 
tie a valid way to arrive at a conception ofthe person as the bearer of moral value. And, 
who is to say that nose-touching and noises is more or less valuable than a philosophical 
discussion with a twelve year old? We must beware of placing value judgements on the 
type of interaction occurring. They are different types of interaction yet both have intrinsic 
value and value because they are parts of valued wholes, wholes which at some stage 
participate in moral interactions.29 
This long and vital passage emphasizes the idea that once unique life comes to be at 
conception, each phase and moment of human existence is continuous and 
inseparable into precise, constituent parts. No one type of interaction can be 
argued to be more important than another. 
Thus, we can see that the theory oflongitudinal human form grants personhood 
to the conceptus on the basis not of what it shall be, but what it is essentially. This 
bestowing of moral significance is consistent with embryological science, 
promotes a sanctity and respect for all persons, and provides a basis for protection 
in any stage of life against undue "violence to the form." 
The Conceptus: Visible Image of the Invisible God 
A medical school professor can banish the topic of abortion from the classroom, 
but can never cast a shadow over the truth. The moral status of the pre-embryo and 
her quest for recognition as a human person have roots above and beyond the 
biological stages of her development. All human life, from conception to natural 
death, is inviolable because each moment of life - from zygote to adult -
possesses a fundamentally identical and morally significant form. If we understand 
ourselves to be human persons - to be guaranteed, whatever else, the right not to 
be killed if we have done nothing wrong - then we must necessarily strive to 
extend this right to all persons. By permitting violence against the longitudinal 
human form,fwe are murdering gens humana. 
My father, a physician, wrote to me on the eve of my departure for medical 
school, "In a world that has lost its respect for human life, it is wonderful that you 
are dedicating yours to enhance it. If you always preserve the belief in the 
transcendent dignity of each human person - the visible image of the invisible 
God - you will never lose your belief in or your efforts for human life." These are 
words for all of us to live by, as we embrace the beauty and sanctity of the human 
form. 
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only a kind of Aristotelian philosophy, because it avoids Aristotle's scientific errors (e.g., that the 
fetus was the egg itself), and yet maintains the importance of form. Secondly, Aristotle's 
metaphysics have sometimes been combined with Kant's ethics to produce the potentiality theory 
described above. That is, the pre-embryo, embryo, or fetus are the potential form of the moral 
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agent, where the moral agent would be a rational, autonomous individual. Obviously, from the 
analysis above this line of reasoning ought to be rejected. By contrast, the theory 1 am proposing 
claims that the pre-embryo is the same form as the adult human, and ought to be respected and 
protected in that regard 
23. Aristotle, Physics 1:2, ed. J.L. Ackrill, A New Aristotle Reader (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987) 
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28. This very argument is the postscript, at which, inexplicably (and unfortunately) Poplawski 
and Gillett seem to arrive in the end of their article. 
29. Poplawski and Gillett, Journal oj Medical Ethics, 66 
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